Version du Règlement : 1988

Demandeurs : 2 sociétés bahamiennes (mère et filiale)

Défendeur : Etat X

L'Etat X s'étant engagé dans un programme d'exploitation de ses ressources minérales, une enquête préliminaire fut menée dans le but d'identifier les zones à retenir pour l'exploration. Afin d'assurer le règlement du prix de cette enquête, l'Etat X concluait un certain nombre de contrats avec les demandeurs dans le but de se procurer des fonds, ainsi que de développer son programme de promotion des minéraux. Parmi ces conventions figurait un contrat de partage de production intitulé « Production Sharing Agreement » (« PSA ») régissant la prospection et l'exploitation de mines d'or par le demandeur n° 2 en vertu de concessions de licence délivrées conformément à la loi de l'Etat X relative à l'exploitation minière. En vertu de cette loi, les concessions de licence d'exploitation minière pouvaient être renouvelées, sous réserve toutefois d'une réduction de 50 % de la surface de la zone couverte par la licence. Les résultats des travaux d'exploitation minière par la société demanderesse qui était partie contractante du PSA furent décevants. En dépit de l'insuffisance de fonds, l'exploration se poursuivit, ce qui nécessita le renouvellement des concessions de licence. Les demandeurs soutenaient que l'opération de prospection avait été entravée par le comportement de l'Etat X, notamment les retards dans l'octroi de permis, l'exercice illégal d'une activité minière sur le territoire sous licence, l'existence d'un concessionnaire de licence antérieur en situation de concurrence, ainsi que par des allégations diffamatoires. Ils demandaient la remise en vigueur des concessions de licence initiales et cherchaient à recouvrer leurs créances, qu'elles fussent relatives aux fonds prêtés à l'Etat X ou aux travaux d'exploration minière. Une ordonnance fut également sollicitée, à l'effet d'empêcher l'Etat X, tant que le litige n'avait pas fait l'objet d'une décision définitive, de céder des droits minéraux dans toute partie du territoire couvert par les cinq concessions de licence initiales. Le défendeur rejeta ces prétentions, soutenant que la société demanderesse qui avait souscrit le PSA avait manqué à ses engagements, en particulier à propos des dépenses minimales du programme d'exploration. Il soutenait également que les deux aspects des relations existant entre les parties - à savoir le financement et la prospection - étaient indépendants l'un de l'autre et que l'exécution de l'un ne dépendait pas de la réalisation de l'autre.

Sur l'ordonnance sollicitée par les demandeurs:

'Issue 2.

"Whether the Arbitral Tribunal has jurisdiction to -

(a) grant to the Claimants an Injunction and/or Restraining Order preventing State X from making any disposition of the mineral rights in any part of the territory covered by the five original Licence concessions until final determination of this dispute by it, or

(b) (i) decide upon the measures that would be necessary to give effect to the Claimants' request that the five original Licences be reinstated ab initio in favour of Claimant 2 with effect from the date of the Arbitral Award, and

(ii) order that such measures be taken."

This issue gives rise to the question of whether or not the Tribunal has jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief, whether of an interim or permanent nature. It arises in the context of the PSA only.

The Claimants submitted that under principles of international law, injunctive relief - even injunctive relief involving re-instatement of the five original licences [-] could be granted by the Tribunal irrespective of the provisions of [the law of State X], which does not permit the granting of injunctive relief against the Government. The Claimants contended that pursuant to, inter alia, Art. 11 of the ICC Rules the Tribunal has the jurisdiction at issue. In relation to the second part of the above issue, they relied upon dicta in the arbitral award rendered in Texas Overseas Petroleum Company and California Asiatic Oil Company v. The Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 17 I.L.M. 1 (1978), (the Texaco Award).

The Defendants contended that the PSA was governed by [the law of State X] and that under that law an Injunction and/or Restraining Order could not lie against the Government. In relation to Issue 2(a), whilst the Defendants accepted that the Tribunal did have jurisdiction to grant the relief, the subject matter of it, they contended that such relief should not be granted in this case as:

(a) there had been delay on the part of the Claimants in pursuing it;

(b) the Tribunal would not have been in a position to monitor compliance with any interim Order it might have made;

(c) Claimant 2 could be adequately compensated in damages and therefore had no requirement for this relief.

In relation to the Issue at 2(b), the Defendants pointed out that the nature of the relief sought by the Claimants was a mandatory injunction. If the Tribunal was to grant such relief, it would in effect be ordering a sovereign State to license a particular party to develop its mineral sector. The Defendants submitted that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to require the Government of State X to license mineral rights. The granting of mineral rights was exclusively within the power of the Government and was regulated by the provisions of the Mining Act. Under that Act the relevant Minister had a discretion to grant prospecting and mining licences. For the Tribunal to make an Order of the type sought would be for it to usurp the function of the Minister under the Act. On this question the Defendants relied upon dicta from the arbitral award rendered in B.P. v. Libya (1973) 53 I.L.R. 29, (the B.P. Award).

By virtue of Article 8.1 of the ICC Rules, the parties have submitted themselves ipso facto to ICC rules insofar as this arbitration is concerned. Article 11 of the same rules establishes that rules governing proceedings before an arbitrator are to be those resulting from the rules. ICC rules do not restrict the powers of an arbitrator where the granting of conservatory or injunctive relief is concerned. In the circumstances and for these reasons, the Tribunal considers that it has jurisdiction to grant relief of the type envisaged in Issue 2(a). It should be noted that subsequent to the framing of the Terms of Reference the Defendants expressly accepted, in their submissions of . . . 1993 that the Tribunal had this jurisdiction.

The remaining submissions of the Defendants in relation to Issue 2(a) relate to the question of whether the jurisdiction in question should be exercised in the present case.

For the same reasons as those set out [in the last paragraph but one] above the Tribunal is of the view that it has jurisdiction to grant relief of the type envisaged at Issue 2(b) above. The question as to whether it should exercise that jurisdiction in favour of the Claimants or at all is of course another matter altogether. The Tribunal regards the Defendants' submissions on this issue to be relevant to the question of the exercise of such jurisdiction rather than to its existence.

Issue 3.

"(a) If the Arbitral Tribunal does have the jurisdiction referred to in para. 2(a) whether, in law, it should grant to Claimants an Injunction and/or Restraining Order preventing State X from making any disposition of the mineral rights in any part of the territory covered by the five original Licence concessions until final determination of the dispute;

(b) if the Arbitral Tribunal does have the jurisdiction referred to in para. 2(b), whether, in law, it should order that the measures necessary to give effect to the Claimants['] request that the five original Licences be reinstated ab initio in favour of Claimant 2 with effect from the date of the Arbitral Award be taken."

The Claimants submitted that the granting of the relief envisaged by this Issue is the only way to prevent State X from reaping the benefits of the Claimants' labours. They contended that having entered the market place State X could not seek to avoid commercial liability and the obligations inherent in the promises made by it. They relied upon the Texaco Award in contending that the Tribunal should apply the principle of restitutio in integrum in relation to the licences.

In relation to the interim relief envisaged by Issue 3(a) the Defendants, whilst accepting the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to grant same, contended that same should not be granted on grounds, as follows:

(a) that Claimant 2 had delayed in making the Application and that it would now be inappropriate and inequitable to grant the relief sought;

(b) Claimant 2 could be adequately compensated in damages and therefore had no requirement for the relief sought;

(c) the Tribunal would not be able to monitor compliance with any interim Order made by it;

(d) that under [the law of State X] an Injunction and/or Restraining Order could not lie against the Government.

In relation to the Issue arising at 3(b), namely, that of a permanent Injunction involving reinstatement of the prospecting licences ab initio, the Defendants pointed out that an Order made in such terms would be an Order to a sovereign state to license a particular party to develop its mineral sector. This Order would be akin to an Order for specific performance and would require parties whose relationship had entirely broken down to work together over a prolonged period. The Defendants also contended that in any event damages would be an adequate remedy. In this regard the Defendants urged the Tribunal to adopt the approach of the Arbitrator in the B.P. Award. In that case in considering the remedies available in international law, the Arbitrator concluded that no Tribunal had ever awarded specific performance or restitutio in integrum in a case which concerned economic interests as opposed to cases concerning state territory or other vital interests. He decided accordingly that damages were the primary remedy in international law.

The Tribunal did not take any step at an earlier stage of the proceedings to consider the question of the granting of interim relief of the type sought. In the Terms of Reference it did not make provision for the determination of such an issue by the issue of a partial Award. As this is a final Award the question of granting interim relief no longer arises. However, had the Tribunal had to face the issue at an earlier stage, it would not have granted interim relief of the type envisaged at Issue 3(a) for the same reasons as those given hereunder in relation to the permanent relief sought and also because it could not have monitored any order made.

The Tribunal is not prepared to make the order envisaged by Issue 3(b), for a number of different reasons which are set out hereunder.

In concluding that it should not make the order sought under this heading, the Tribunal accepts, in their entirety, those arguments of the Defendants which are based upon dicta in the B.P. Award. Whilst accepting that in certain extremely rare instances scope might exist for the granting of a permanent order granting specific performance or restitutio in integrum, it does not appear to the Tribunal that this case falls into the category that would qualify. This case put in issue the economic interests of the parties involved. Any damage to such interests is capable of being catered for by an award in damages. Accordingly, as damages would be an adequate remedy for either party, the question of granting relief in the form of an order for specific performance or restitutio in integrum does not arise. In this regard the Tribunal is also conscious of the fact that the Claimants have, in the alternative, made a claim in these proceedings for the entirety of the loss allegedly sustained by them, including alleged loss of profits. In these circumstances, it follows that the Tribunal declines to follow the approach followed by the arbitrator in the Texaco Award.'